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Abstract
This paper presents the design and implementation of a lightweight node authentication protocol which comprises of node
registration, node authentication and key establishment phases. The solution leverages the low computational overheads associated
with cryptographically secure one-way hash chains and Elliptical Curve Crytography (ECC) without using any digital signature
algorithm or any public key cryptography. The usage of hidden generator point derived from hash-chains provides defense against
a man-in-the-middle attack which is prominent in ECDH (Elliptical Curve Difﬁe-Hellman) due to lack of entity authentication.
The authentication protocol has been simulated on Tossim and its performance bench marking has also been carried out.
© 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V.
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1. Introduction
The resource constrained nature of sensor nodes characterized by limited energy, small memory and less
computational power1 prohibit the use of conventional security primitives as used by other networks to mitigate
various threats2. Thus, the design of appropriate security solutions for WSN has been an active research challenge.
Any potent existing security solution no matter how effective it might be in the case of other networks has to ﬁt itself
into WSN framework mainly comprised of resource constraint nodes. A tradeoff between the security services and
resources consumed has to be weighed properly before deciding on its adoption. Thus, the design of new protocols
and security architecture to implement conﬁdentiality, data integrity, data authentication and data freshness within a
resource constraint network like WSN has to be viewed in the correct perspective3.
This paper focuses on one of the important security services like Node Authentication and Key Generation and
Establishment among the broad domain of security concerns faced by theWSN. Authentication is an important security
primitive in any class of network both at the entity level as well as at the message level. In message authentication,
there is no timeliness guarantee with respect to the message while as entity authentication occurs in real time and
both the parties have to be live at that moment though no meaningful message is exchanged4,5. All the network
entities comprising of WSN including nodes, cluster heads and base station need to be authenticated before sending or
receiving any kind of communication within them. Public Key Cryptography offers broad-based solutions to address
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all the security concerns. However, such solutions are far too expensive to be applied directly to WSN owing to its
resource constraints6. Key establishment plays a pivotal role in ensuring authentication. An uncomplicated yet efﬁcient
method to share secret keys in WSN is based on ECDH. On a MICAZ mote, ECDH operation takes 9.8 seconds
to establish shared keys between a pair of nodes7. However, ECDH suffers from Man-in-the-Middle Attack. The
Man-in-the-Middle-Attack can be overcome by using Hidden Generator Point concept8,9 and proper authentication
mechanism.
In a broader framework, a proper access control mechanism has to be enforced within the network which could
broadly have two levels:
• Node Authentication
• Proper Key generation & Establishment.
This paper presents the design and implementation of a lightweight node authentication protocol for WSN on
TinyOS10. The proposed work facilitates node registration, node authentication and key establishment. The solution
primarily leverages the low computational overheads associated with cryptographically secure one-way hash chains
without using any digital signature algorithm.
Rest of the paper is organized as following: Section 2 provides an insight into the related work, Section 3 describes
the detailed Authentication protocol in 4 phases, section 4 gives the implementation details Section 5 highlights the
security analysis of the proposed scheme, section 6 discusses the performance of the proposed protocol, while as
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2. Related Work
Authenticationmechanisms using Hash Chains are considered to be computationally feasible for resource constraint
network like WSN. Hash Chains were ﬁrst proposed by Lamport who used it for generating one-time password11. This
involves applying a hash function h(.) repeatedly z times to a seed s to form a hash chain of length z. The hash (.) is
easy to compute but hard to invert e.g., h(h(h(s))) gives a hash chain of length 3 and can be denoted by h3(s). The
initial element of the hash chain is called the seed and the last element is called committed value or the tip of the hash
chain. The tip of the chain is public and is distributed among the nodes and the elements of the chain are consumed
one after other until the secret key is free. Hash chains ﬁnd exclusive use in data integrity and entity authentication.
The i th element of the hash chain denoted as Ki is expressed as:
Ki (s) = h(hz−i (s)) (1)
The committed value of the chain is made public while as the seed acts as private or secret value. The scheme does
not overcome the need for an authenticated initial key-exchange. By the deﬁnition of entity authentication, Lamport’s
one-time passwords do not provide entity authentication as there is no proof of an active communication between the
two parties. Some of the relevant schemes offering entity authentication as part of overall access control have been
given by Zhou12 et al. which is based on ECC and ECC-based digital signature scheme ECDSA. It has been proved to
be an energy efﬁcient than RSA. It achieves node authentication and key establishment for new nodes by including both
node identity and node bootstrapping time into the authentication procedure. However, it uses timestamps and assumes
that each sensor node can sustain time interval before it can be compromised. Therefore, for practical implementations,
it is not thought to be convenient. Huang proposed NACP13 scheme which is based on Hash chains and ECC. It is
simple, energy efﬁcient supports new node addition but has been found to be vulnerable to replay attack and new
node masquerading attacks. This is attributed to the absence of any mutual authentication between node and base
station. It also lacks hash chain renewability. Other schemes supporting authentication where given under ENACP an
enhancement over NACP, PACP and NDACP14. Out of the schemes discussed only ENACP provides authenticated
broadcast.
3. Proposed Node Authentication Protocol
The proposed scheme presents a comprehensive pair-wise entity authentication protocol with the proper key
establishment in 4 phases i.e. Initialization, Node registration, Key generation and Node authentication and Node to
Node authentication involving Node identities. The notations used in the protocol are tabulated in Table 1.
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Table 1. Notations used.
Symbol Notation
h() One way-hash function
p A prime number
Zp A ﬁnite ﬁeld
Ep Elliptic curve
G, Ga, Gb Generator point of order n
Ni Node identity of i th node
Nj Node identity of j th node
BS Base station
Ki Secret key of i th node
K j Secret key of j th node
Ks Secret key of base station
z Large integer
hm(k) m cascade hash operations on key k




Let there be r nodes with N1, N2, . . . , Nr as their identities constituting the neighborhood of a WSN. The node
identities are integer numbers. The base station (BS) selects secret key ks and computes its hash chain hz(ks) by
applying the select hash function h(.)z times over ks . BS also generates r number of secret keys k1, k2, . . . , kr for
each of the node. It calculates hz(ki) as the hash-chain commitment of each node with i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , r by repeatedly
applying hash function z times. Further BS initiates following actions:
• It preloads each of the Node Ni with its associated secret key Ki (seed) and one-way hash function h().
• It calculates its own hash chain commitment hz(ks) and preloads it in all the nodes.
• It selects an elliptic curve Ep, a cyclic group G and preloads its associated parameters like G, n, a, b, p, H in all
the nodes.
3.2 Node registration
In the post-deployment phase, each node has to register itself with the base station before it can communicate with
the other nodes in its neighborhood.
Step 1: Ni → Baseh(Ni ⊕ki), Ni : Ni hashes the XOR of its node-id Ni with its secret key ki and sends it to the base
along with its node-id. BS Veriﬁes the h(Ni ⊕ ki ) by using the ki from its own storage and Ni from the Step 1. If the
veriﬁcation holds, then base station adds node Ni to its access control list.
Step 2: The purpose of this step is to broadcast the hash chain commitment of the registered node hz(ki ) by the BS in
an authenticated manner. The authenticated broadcast of base station to the nodes is achieved in the following steps:
BS → ∗ : h(hz−1((ks)‖(hz(ki ) ⊗ Ni )‖nB)) = zi (2)
BS → ∗ : (hz(ki ) ⊗ Ni ), hz−1(ks), Ni , nB (3)
hz−1(ks) is the secret chain value of BS and can be computed only by the BS. It has the signiﬁcance of private key
to BS. This value is concatenated to hash chain commitment of the registered node and its id as per expression zi .
nB is a nonce and has been added to mitigate replay attack.
Step 3: On receiving the above broadcast as per (2) and (3), nodes in the network including Ni ﬁrst verify the
expression:
h(hz−1(ks)) = h(ks) (4)
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If found true, (which implies that it has originated from BS), only then the expression:
h(hz−1(ks))‖hz(ki) ⊕ Ni )‖nB) (5)
is evaluated and compared with the value of BS broadcast zi . If it holds, then the hash chain commitment hz(ki ) of Ni
is extracted from (hz(ki ) ⊕ Ni ) by Ex-oring it with Ni and then registered in their access control list along with the
node-id Ni . The broadcast hash chain of BS is updated to hz−1(ks).
3.3 Key generation and node authentication
Suppose a pair of nodes i.e. Ni and Nj which are in each other’s radio range want to communicate with each other.
Let z be the hash chain length of both the nodes. Let Ni and Nj have successfully passed through u and v times
authentication respectively.
Key generation step using hidden generator:
Pair-wise symmetric key generation between two communicating nodes is computed using hidden generator
concept. By this, it is assumed that the two nodes have different Generator points Ga and Gb for the elliptic curve Eq.,
which has not been made public. This would help in mitigating the man-in-the-middle attack. Node identities are also
tied-up to key generation.
Ist Exchange between Ni and N j
Ni → Nj : Ga.(hz−u−1(ki )).Nj (6)
Nj → Ni : Gb.(hz−v−1(k j )).Ni (7)
Assuming that the current hash chain value of Ni and Nj is hz−u and hz−v respectively. The scalar multiplication of
hash chain secrets of two nodes i.e, hz−u−1(ki) and hz−v−1(k j)) and node identities Ni and Nj with the respective
generator points Ga and Gb shall result in a point on the elliptic curve. It will also associate node identity with the
process of key generation.
2nd Exchange between Ni and N j
Nodes will exchange their hash chain secrets which can be generated by them only.
Ni → Nj : hz−u−1(ki ) (8)
Nj → Ni : hz−v−1(k j ) (9)
Veriﬁcation phase
Ni veriﬁes h(hz−v−1(k j )) = hz−v (k j ), if true, then it computes
Gb.[hz−v−1(k j )].Nj .[hz−v−1(k j )]−1.[Nj ]−1 = Gb (10)
N j veriﬁes h(hz−u−1(ki )) = hz−u(ki ), if true, then it computes:
Ga.[hz−u−1(ki )].Ni .[hz−u−1(ki )]−1.[Nj ]−1 = Ga (11)
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Shared key between Ni and N j
Now after 4 exchanges, Ni has the knowledge of Gb that is the generator point of Nj and Nj has the knowledge of
Ga that is the Generator point of Ni .Ni and N j arrive at a Common Generator Gs = Ga + Gb. Gs is a point on the
elliptic curve P(xs, ys). The shared key between Ni and N j shall be the x coordinate of point P i.e., xs. The pairwise
symmetric key established between Ni and Nj = xi j .
3.4 Node-Node Authentication
Node to Node Authentication is based upon veriﬁcation of hash chain commitment of each node, their node identity
and the shared key between them. If either of the veriﬁcation tests fails, then the authentication will not be completed.
Assuming Ni has completed u and N j has completed v number of successful authentications.
Ni computes the following expressions ai and ak and sends it to N j :
Ni → Nj : h(hz−u−1(ki )‖Nj ) = ai (12)
Ni → Nj : h(hz−u−1(ki )‖xi j ) = ak (13)
Ni broadcasts hz−u−1(ki ) and Nj .
Similarly Nj computes the following expression b j and bk and sends it to Ni :
Nj → Ni : h(hz−v−1(k j )‖Ni ) = b j (14)
Nj → Ni : h(hz−v−1(k j )‖xi j ),= bk (15)
Nj broadcasts hz−v−1(k j ) and Ni .
Veriﬁcation phase
Ni computes the following expression: h(hz−v−1(k j )) = hz−v (k j ). If found correct then Ni veriﬁes the following
expression:
h(hz−v−1(k j )‖Ni ) = b j (16)
h(hz−v−1(k j )‖xi j ) = bk (17)
If both the veriﬁcations hold, then Ni authenticates Nj as expressions b j and bk would have been computed by Nj
only. Similarly, N j computes the following expressions: h(hz−u−1(ki )) = hz−u(ki). If found correct then N j veriﬁes
the following expression:
h(hz−u−1(ki )‖Nj ) = ai (18)
h(hz−u−1(ki )‖xi j ) = ak (19)
If both the veriﬁcations hold, then N j authenticates Ni as expressions aj and ak would have been computed by N j
only. Upon successful authentication, Ni upgrades its hash chain to hz−u−1(ki) and Nj upgrades its hash chain to
hz−v−1(k j ) and the same is communicated to BS.
4. Simulation
The protocols were implemented in TinyOS operating system using NesC Language and simulated on TOSSIM15.
TinyOS is an open-source lightweight operating system speciﬁcally designed for low-power wireless sensors. The
NesC programs developed were enabled with a highly optimized ECC implementation, TinyECC16. The simulation
has been carried out in TOSSIM Simulator using DBG ﬂags. The output of various calculation and transmissions in the
protocols has been captured. TOSSIM provides conﬁguration of debugging output at runtime. The simulation output
of node registration and Node authentication & Key generation are shown in Table 2 and Table 3.
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Table 2. Simulation Output of Node Registration.
Table 3. Simulation Output of Node Authentication and Key Generation.
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5. Security Analysis
5.1 Man-in-the-middle attack
A man-in-the-middle attack is normally launched due to lack of authentication between the communicating entities
as is prominent in ECDH. An adversary can also launch MIM by misusing the public disclosure of Elliptical Curve
Parameters especially the Generator Point. In our proposed scheme, the concept of hidden generator has been used,
wherein communicating nodes make exchanges arrive at a common generator point which is not known to the other
entities. Moreover, Shared key generation has been tied to Node identities which make the scheme more robust against
MIM.
5.2 Instant authentication
In a Broadcast authentication protocol like μ-tesla3, nodes cannot authenticate the packets instantaneously because
of the delayed disclosure of keys. This can be exploited by an adversary who can inject forged messages into the
network and launch denial of service attack. In our proposed scheme instant authentication is provided upfront,
by verifying the hash chain secret value before evaluating other expressions. Packets need not be buffered for
authentication as done in the case of μ-tesla.
5.3 Malicious node injection
A node is to ﬁrst register itself with the base station during Registration phase by making use of Node id and secret
key ki . It is only on successful registration, the hash chain commitment is communicated to the node by the base
station. This step prevents a malicious node to join the network as it cannot participate in the network communication
without forcing its entry into the Access control list of BS.
6. Energy Analysis and Performance Benchmarking
Most of the computational work during initialization phase is shifted to the base station which is supposed to be
resource strong. The nodes are kept computationally light by making judicious use of hash functions which occupy
around 10 kbytes ROM memory. The ECC operation is used only to generate keys. No computationally intensive
techniques involving the use of certiﬁcations or digital signature for the purpose of broadcast authentication has been
used in the proposed scheme. For capturing computational time of different key operations like Point Addition, Scalar
Multiplication, Inverse, Hash (Sha1) a fundamental setup was created using MicaZ17 mote and an MIB52017 Gateway.
The computational time recorded for different operations is shown in Table 4.
The number of critical operations in various phases of the authentication framework is tabulated in Table 5. For
calculation of energy E = V ∗ i ∗ t (joules) is used, where V and I stand for voltage and current drawn respectively,
Table 4. Computational Time Recorded.
S. No. Operation Time in Secs.
1 Scalar Multiplication 3.90
2 Point Addition 0.14
3 Inverse Operation 0.12
4 Sha1 0.0091
Table 5. Critical Operation in Node Authentication Protocol.
S. No. Phase Scalar Multiplication Point Addition Inverse Multiplication Hash
1 Initialization – – – –
2 Node registration – – – 7
3 Node authentication and Key exchange 4 1 4 4
4 Node to Node Authentication – – – 12
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Table 6. Energy and Time Analysis of Node Authentication Protocol.
S. No. Phase Time Taken (Secs) Energy Consumed (mJ)
1 Initialization – –
2 Node registration 0.063 3.72
3 Key generation 16.25 960.375
4 Node to Node Authentication 0.109 6.44
Total 16.42 970.53
Table 7. Comparison of Operation for Establishing Hidden Generator Point.
Total Number of Total Number of Total Number of Protection Total
Exchanges to Scalar Inverse Against MIM Computational
Scheme Establish Key Multiplications Operations Attack Cost
ECDH 02 04 Nil N 06
Ravi K Scheme 06 08 2 Y 16
Our Scheme 04 04 2 Y 10
t is the execution time for each operation. MicaZ node using Atmel AT Mega128 L is powered by 02 AA batteries.
With a voltage of 3V for 02 AA batteries and a maximum load current of 19.7mA, the energy and time calculations
are indicated in Table 6.
The Hidden generator scheme used for generation and establishment of pairwise keys has been compared with
ECDH and the one given by Ravi et al.18
Our scheme has low computational cost and less number of broadcasts as compared to Ravi et al. as shown in
Table 7.
7. Conclusions
The proposed entity authentication scheme was implemented by leveraging computationally light Hash chains and
Elliptical Curve Cryptography. Shared pairwise key have been derived by using Hidden Generator Points and is tied
to the Node identities and hash chain values. This gives a safeguard against MIM attack eminent in ECDH. The
Framework doesn’t use any digital signature mechanism to achieve authenticated broadcasts. Instead, secret value of
hash chains has been used for the purpose. The framework can be embedded into any WSN based application where
Entity authentication is a requirement.
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